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This paper provides a cross-country comparison of life-cycle and business-cycle fluctuations 
in the dispersion of household-level wage innovations. We draw our inference from 
household panel data sets for the US, the UK, and Germany. First, we find that household 
characteristics explain about 25% of the dispersion in wages within an age group in all three 
countries. Second, the cross-sectional variance of wages is almost linearly increasing in 
household age in all three countries, but with increments being smaller in the European data. 
Third, we find that wage risk is procyclical in Germany while it is countercyclical in the US 
and acyclical in the UK, pointing towards labor market institutions being pivotal in determining 
the cyclical properties of labor market risk. 
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A growing macroeconomic literature has documented that economic uncertainty neg-
atively comoves with the business cycle, i.e. uncertainty increases in recessions and
decreases during booms. For example, Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2009) show
that, in the US, stock market volatility spikes at times of economic downturn. Gilchrist
et al. (2009) ￿nd a similar result looking at the link of credit spreads, uncertainty, and
investment. Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) ￿nd a close negative correlation between
the frequency of using the word ￿ uncertainty￿in the ￿ New York Times￿and economic
activity in the US. Bachmann and Bayer (2009a) ￿nd for a large panel of German ￿rms
that the dispersion of ￿rm-level productivity growth rates is signi￿cantly countercyclical.
Finally, Storesletten et al. (2004) document from US PSID data a negative correlation
of the cycle with the dispersion of innovations to household income.1 In summary, there
is growing evidence that microeconomic uncertainty, i.e. the cross-sectional variance of
idiosyncratic shocks, is strongly linked to business cycle movements.
This paper adds to this literature in two aspects: ￿rst, by analyzing the cyclicality
of the cross-sectional dispersion of wage-innovations instead of innovations to earnings.
This is important as wages are more closely linked to productivity and are less subject
to endogenous household decisions than earnings. Second, we contribute by providing a
cross-country perspective on the cyclicality of the dispersion of wage-innovations, com-
paring the US, the UK, and Germany. This means we provide results across a set of
di⁄erent labor market setups, in which the US labor market is the most liberal and
the German labor market the most regulated one, while the UK labor market can be
considered the intermediate case. Interestingly, we ￿nd this ranking to be also re￿ ected
empirically in the cyclicality of wage risk: the US displays countercyclical, the UK
acyclical, and Germany procyclical dispersions in wage innovations.
Why are these cross-country di⁄erences important? One can interpret our ￿ndings
in two ways. First, one can think of wages as re￿ ecting marginal productivity as in a
neoclassical model. Given this interpretation, our ￿ndings suggest that there are sig-
ni￿cant structural di⁄erences in the way productivity risk behaves between the three
large economies studied. This might be important for thinking about the driving forces
of aggregate ￿ uctuations in various countries, for example as in Bloom et al. (2009) or
1The life-cycle of earnings inequality without explicitly linking wage risk to the business cycle has
been studied in various papers. For the three countries we focus on - UK, US, Germany - examples are:
(for the UK) Dickens (2000), Gossling et al. (2000), Blundell et al. (2006), and Blundell and Etheridge
(2009) (for the US) Guvenen (2007a,b), Krueger and Perri (2006), Primiceri and van Rens (2007), and
Heathcote et al. (2009), (for Germany) Krueger et al. (2009).
2Gilchrist et al. (2009). Second, one can think of wages as rather an outcome of com-
plex economic processes, such as bargaining with unions, search-and-matching, or sticky
wage-setting. In this second case, the cyclicality of wage risk may help discriminating
between (quantitatively) di⁄erent labor market models, similar to the point made by
Bachmann and Bayer (2009b) for the cyclicality of the investment rate dispersion, which
is found to be a strong overidentifying restriction in heterogenous ￿rm RBC models. This
point of view is linked to the general point made by Gomme et al. (2004) that taking
into account subgroup heterogeneity may well enhance our understanding of business-
cycle ￿ uctuations at the aggregate level. Examples of this approach are Heathcote et
al. (2007) or Sargent and Ljungqvist (2008), who emphasize the role of income risk in a
general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households. Finally, ￿ uctuations in wage
risk are important factors in determining the costs of business cycles, see for example
Krebs (2003, 2007).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our statis-
tical model setup. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 presents our GMM
estimation results followed by a set of robustness checks. The last section concludes the
paper. Appendices follow.
2 Wage Process and Estimator
To describe the life-cycle development of wage dispersion and the business-cycle depen-
dence of wage risk, we specify a statistical time-series model of a household￿ s average
wage rate. We assume that the average wage rate of a household i that has h years of














it is a vector of observable household characteristics and !h
it is the wage residual.
The wage residual is composed of a household ￿xed e⁄ect ￿i; a transitory i.i.d. (or
measurement error) term "it; and a persistent component zh
it: This component zh
it follows
an AR-1 process with autocorrelation ￿ and innovations ￿t￿it, with variance ￿2
￿ = 1: We
assume that the variance of ￿xed e⁄ects as well as the variance of measurement error,
￿2
￿ and ￿2
"; are constant over time, while the variance of persistent shocks is potentially
time varying. In particular, we assume that the scaling parameter ￿t depends on the
3business cycle, such that
￿t = ￿(Yt);
where Yt is some measure of aggregate activity, e.g. deviations from trend GDP growth.
This speci￿cation is close to the one used in Storesletten et al. (2004), where ￿t can take
two values, ￿L and ￿H; depending on whether GDP growth is below or above average,
but generalizes their framework by allowing for more than two regimes. We parameterize
￿ as
￿(Yt)=￿ +
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which allows the e⁄ect of business cycles to vary according to the strength and not just
to the sign of the cycle. We impose ￿ ￿;￿ > 0 in order to ensure that ￿t > 0: We choose Yt
to be standardized GDP deviations from trend, such that
￿+￿ ￿
2 is the variance at trend
growth and the sign of
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
re￿ ects whether the dispersion of wage innovations is
pro- or countercyclical.
We estimate the parameters of the model using a generalized method of moments
estimator, where ￿following Storesletten et al. (2004) ￿we derive moment conditions
by conditioning on the business cycle history of a cohort c = t￿h at time t: This allows
us to exploit business cycle history beyond the actual time-span of our panel data on
wages. For a household with labor market experience h the variance of !h












Due to the persistency parameter ￿ the wage dispersion in an age-year cell ￿1;t;h mem-
orizes past business cycle episodes. This can be thought of as the annual rings of a
tree capturing information on historic climatic conditions. In addition, the persistency
implies that ￿1;t;h displays a clear life-cycle pattern, as has been discussed in detail for
example in Deaton and Paxson (1994). The pro￿le of ￿1;t;h in h is the closer to linear
the closer ￿ is to 1, i.e. the higher the persistency of shocks to wages.












4We use this second set of moment conditions to discriminate between the variance of
￿xed e⁄ects ￿2
￿ and the variance of transitory e⁄ects or measurement error ￿2
": More-
over, this second set of moments helps to identify the autocorrelation coe¢ cient ￿ more
directly. Yet, exploiting these moment conditions requires observing a household in two
consecutive years, such that it requires the use of panel data.












and their empirical counterparts (m1;m2):
^ ￿ = argmin[(￿1;￿2) ￿ (m1;m2)]W[(￿1;￿2) ￿ (m1;m2)]
0 ; (4)
where W is a positive de￿nite weighting matrix that captures the correlation structure
across moments, see Appendix A for details. We evaluate the properties of this estima-
tor in a number of Monte-Carlo experiments and ￿nd that the estimator is capable of
identifying the cyclicality of wage risk in data sets of a size comparable to the data sets
at hand, see Appendix B.
3 Data
3.1 Sample Selection
Our data base consists of three large household panel data sets as well as aggregate
real GDP data for all three countries. We draw our inference from the PSID (for the
US), the BHPS (for the UK), and the GSOEP (for Germany). All three data sets are
constructed in a similar manner and include information on pre-tax labor income, hours
worked, and a set of household characteristics, such as education, household size etc.
Yet, the three data sets cover di⁄erent periods of time: the PSID data we use provides
annual information for the years 1968-1997, the BHPS for 1991-2007, and the GSOEP
for 1984-2006.
To compute a household￿ s average wage rate, we use information on pre-tax labor
income and hours worked. The labor income of a household is de￿ned as the annual in-
come from employment or self employment of household head and spouse. Analogously,
we de￿ne the total market hours of work a household supplies. We abstract from hours
worked in home production. By pooling information on household head and spouse we
take the view that household composition is a fundamental risk of the household. We
select households as the unit of interest in our analysis, because labor market decisions
of each individual household member are subject to the risk-sharing agreements within
the household and will thus di⁄er signi￿cantly according to household composition. In
5our baseline estimations, we do not further restrict the samples to male household heads,
as we understand household composition as one fundamental source of income and pro-
ductivity risk over the life-cycle, e.g. due to death of the main earner. Yet, we run a
robustness check in which we consider males only.
We restrict the data sets as follows. We remove all observations with missing income,
education or hours data, and remove observations where the household head is below
25 or above 56 years of age. For the PSID, we drop all households that belong to the
Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) or the Latino sample. For the BHPS, we keep
only households living in England.2 For the GSOEP, we restrict the sample to West
German households and drop observations from the migrant and high income sample.
Moreover, we remove all households where the household head is a migrant who has
immigrated to Germany after the age of ten. We expect the productivity life cycle of
migrants to be governed by other institutional factors (e.g. education) than those of
non-migrants.3
We use the age h of the household head to attach a working and business cycle history
to each household in a given year t. We de￿ne an age-year (h;t) cell as the sub-sample
of households in year t with the same year of birth c = t ￿ h; irrespective of the exact
date of the survey interview relative to the exact date-of-birth of the interviewee. From
the information of the household￿ s labor income yit and hours worked ￿it we calculate
the household￿ s wage rate wit := yit=￿it: We restrict the sample to those households that
supply at least 520 hours of market work per year, being equivalent to at least a quarter
of full-time employment of one household member (assuming 40 hours per week). In
addition, we apply a three standard deviation criterion to the wage rate for each age-
year cell of households to identify outliers, which we then remove from the sample. We
experimented with alternative outlier selection criteria which in general lead to similar
results, see Section 4.2. Finally, a household enters the sample only if we observe the
household at least in two consecutive years since we want to calculate autocovariances.
This means we generate a set of two-year overlapping panels from the original data,
which we then use for the analysis. Tables 8 and 7 in Appendix C provide information
2The BHPS started with mainly households living in England. In later sample waves, households from
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland were added to the BHPS, which implies that these economically
diverse parts of the UK do not have a constant sampling weight.
3We treat the GSOEP data di⁄erently to the other data sources in this respect, because in the GSOEP
the year of entry into the country of a household member is easily available. Controlling for the status of
a migrant could be important for three reasons: First, it is not clear how comparable years of schooling
are for migrants doing their schooling abroad. Second, migrants who enter the country in working age
have gone through a di⁄erent business cycle history. Third, migration often comes in waves that are
likely to be related to the business cycle.
6on the number of observations (i.e. households) by year in each two-year panel as well
as on the number of observations we loose due to the sample selection.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Importance of Observable Characteristics by Age
Since we are concerned with the evolution and cyclicality of wage risk, we need to ￿lter
from the observed wages the in￿ uence of ￿xed household characteristics. We do so by
estimating (1) in two steps. First we estimate ￿ by OLS and then use the residuals of this
estimation ^ !h
it to calculate the moments as in (2) and (3): In the ￿rst-stage regression, we
use dummies for age, education, gender, and household size to control for ￿xed household
characteristics plus year dummies to control for time e⁄ects. Since deterministic wage
pro￿les in age may be di⁄erent across education groups, we add third-order polynomials
in age for each education class (classes being roughly equivalent to: CSE or below, O-lvl
/ GCSE, A-lvls or occupational training, some tertiary, ￿rst university degree, higher
degree).4
To obtain a ￿rst impression of (a) how much of wage variability is predictable and
(b) whether there are substantial di⁄erences between the three data sets already at this
stage, we calculate the ratio between the variance due to deterministic di⁄erences in
wages and the variance of the "un￿ltered" wage data (controlling only for time e⁄ects)





raw(h) are displayed in Figure 1. As one can see, deterministic di⁄erences
explain for no age group more than 30% of the variance of wages. In all three data
sets household characteristics become more important over the life-cycle in explaining
wage dispersion, with a peak of the importance around 40 years of age, which then
levels out. While the pro￿les are similar overall, a di⁄erence appears for younger ages
in the GSOEP, where the ￿rst stage regression has particularly low explanatory power.
One possible reason could be the larger variability of the age of labor market entry in
Germany.
3.2.2 Age Pro￿les of the Wage Dispersion
Next, we consider a reduced-form life-cycle pattern of the residual wage dispersion as has
become standard in this literature since Deaton and Paxson (1994). For this purpose,
we regress the empirical variance of the wage residual m1;t;h on age and time dummies.
For identi￿cation, we assume that time e⁄ects are mean zero. Figure 2 displays the
corresponding age pro￿les.
4Results of the ￿rst stage regression are available on request.
7Figure 1: R2 Statistics for the Wage Regression on Household Characteristics
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Figure 2: Life-Cycle Pro￿le of the Variance of Wages



































Results from a year-time decomposition of the age-year speci￿c variances m1;t;h as in
Deaton and Paxson (1994). Time e⁄ects are assumed to be mean zero for
identi￿cation. The graph displays the estimated age coe¢ cients.
8The ￿gure shows that residual wage dispersion is the highest in the US at almost
all ages and the lowest in Germany. Moreover, all three countries display age-pro￿les
that are (almost linearly) increasing in age, which suggests high levels of autocorrelation
(for an in-depth discussion see e.g. Deaton and Paxson, 1994). Finally, the slope of the
age-pro￿le is steepest for the US, which implies that the di⁄erence in the variance of
wages between countries increases in age.
4 Estimation of Wage Processes
4.1 Baseline Speci￿cation
Having illustrated that the wage process is likely to have a long memory, we can exploit
the business cycle history of each cohort as has been proposed by Storesletten et al.
(2004). Yet, we need to decide on the subset of moments we want to match from the
vector of moments m: In their baseline speci￿cation, Storesletten et al. (2004) restrict the
set of moments to those from a subset of age groups, a theoretical reason for which could
be that further moment conditions provide little extra information but only increase
estimation uncertainty (i.e. moment conditions being "weak"). However, experimenting
with such selected age groups in a set of Monte-Carlo experiments did not show any
evidence of a problem of weak moment conditions, see Appendix B. Correspondingly,
increasing the number of moment conditions in general increases the precision of the
estimator. Therefore, we use all ages between 30 and 55 and all available years for each
sample. We restrict ourselves to this prime-age group in order to eliminate the e⁄ect
of country-speci￿c di⁄erences in household formation (age below 30) and retirement (at
ages 55+) that may otherwise in￿ uence our results. We assume that households enter
the labor market - more speci￿cally, accumulate labor market shocks - at the age of 25.
Table 1 presents the estimation results from our baseline speci￿cation. As a measure
of the aggregate cycle we use linearly detrended standardized ￿rst di⁄erences of log-GDP.
We calculate standard errors by running 1,000 bootstrap replications drawing households
in each two-year panel.5
We ￿nd that for the US, wage risk is strongly and signi￿cantly counter-cyclical,
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0: This con￿rms evidence for income risk in the US provided by Storesletten
et al. (2004). Wage risk at trend growth,
￿ ￿+￿
2 ; is larger in the US than for the other
countries, while it is smallest for Germany. Also in stark di⁄erence to the US, wage
5We disregard the fact that the wage residuals are results of a ￿rst stage regression, such that regres-
sion uncertainty in theory adds to the estimation uncertainty in the second step. Yet, with the number
of observations being as large as in our samples the variation introduced by regression uncertainty in the
￿rst stage is negligibly small.
9Table 1: Baseline Estimation Results
PSID BHPS GSOEP
￿ .9245 .9246 .9190
(:0300) (:0255) (:0136)
￿2
￿ .0443 .0096 .0280
(:0383) (:0257) (:0089)
￿2
" .0440 .0404 .0316
(:0063) (:0046) (:0019) ￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 .0252 .0192 .0102
(:0109) (:0074) (:0025)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.0504 .0107 .0204
(:0218) (:0091) (:0049)
Estimation results from a generalized method of moments estimation as given by eq.
(4); see appendix for details. Standard errors (in parentheses) obtained from 1,000
bootstrap replications.
risk is procyclical in Germany. A one standard deviation decrease in the business cycle
component of GDP growth increases wage risk in the US by roughly 46% while it de-
creases wage risk by the same fraction in Germany. For the UK we ￿nd procyclicality in
wage risk, but the estimate is not signi￿cant and quantitatively much smaller than for
Germany, so that wage risk can be described as acyclical for the UK. In fact, the point
estimate for the UK changes sign when we use di⁄erent measures of cyclicality as in the
robustness checks below. By contrast, the ￿ndings for Germany and the US turn out to
be robust.
Interestingly, the importance of transitory shocks (or measurement error) seems to
be similar across data sets as we obtain very similar estimates. Also the persistence of
wage shocks is surprisingly similar across data sets with ^ ￿ ￿ :92. What di⁄ers though is
the size of the variance of ￿xed e⁄ects. Yet these variances are not precisely estimated.
4.2 Robustness Checks
Next, we check the robustness of these ￿ndings to changes in the measure of cyclicality
and sample construction. First, we check the robustness to alternative measures of the
cycle. As alternatives, we capture the cyclical component of GDP by HP-￿ltering with
a smoothing parameter of 6.25 following Uhlig and Ravn (2002) and HP-￿ltering with
10Table 2: Robustness to Cyclical Indicator
GDP-HP(6.25) GDP-HP(100)
PSID BHPS GSOEP PSID BHPS GSOEP
￿ .9138 .9275 .8991 .9000 .9189 .9097
(:0469) (:0240) (:0362) (:0389) (:0264) (:0148)
￿2
￿ .0319 .0147 .0441 .0000 .0000 .0383
(:0484) (:0242) (:0178) (:0369) (:0257) (:0085)
￿2
" .0413 .0413 .0319 .0354 .0391 .0319
(:0085) (:0041) (:0037) (:0078) (:0044) (:0019) ￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 .0306 .0177 .0087 .0419 .0220 .0092
(:0151) (:0066) (:0064) (:0135) (:0070) (:0021)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.0613 -0.0234 .0175 -.0839 -.0151 .0183
(:0218) (:0091) (:0049) (:0270) (:0097) (:0043)
See notes to Table 1.
Table 3: Robustness to Sample Selection
Percentile-Outlier-Criterion Labor Market Entry at Age 22
PSID BHPS GSOEP PSID BHPS GSOEP
￿ .9319 .9352 .9218 .9349 .9450 .9328
(:0209) (:0249) (:0114) (:0304) (:0153) (:0090)
￿2
￿ .0640 .0248 .0253 .0000 .0000 .0098
(:0389) (:0269) (:0079) (:0393) (:0214) (:0081)
￿2
" .0496 .0420 .0316 .0424 .0424 .0313
(:0059) (:0044) (:0018) (:0055) (:0034) (:0018) ￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 .0213 .0147 .0102 .0279 .0154 .0112
(:0102) (:0070) (:0022) (:0086) (:0044) (:0018)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.0426 .0014 .0204 -.0558 .0133 .0224
(:0202) (:0088) (:0044) (:0173) (:0077) (:0037)
See notes to Table 1.
11Table 4: Sample Split According to Skill
Low and Medium Skilled High and Medium Skilled
PSID BHPS GSOEP PSID BHPS GSOEP
￿ .9256 .9555 .9165 .9512 .9572 .9263
(0.0386) (0.0662) (0.0119) (0.0330) (0.0137) (0.0134)
￿2
￿ .0612 .0637 .0196 .0771 .0000 .0343
(0.0407) (0.0641) (0.009) (0.0422) (0.0095) (0.0081)
￿2
" .0439 .0436 .0287 .0507 .0438 .0322
(0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0019) (0.0064) (0.0084) (0.0018) ￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 .0211 .0062 .0118 .0143 .0166 .0086
(0.0119) (0.0179) (0.0025) (0.0112) (0.0035) (0.0022)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.0422 -.0003 .0237 -.0287 -.0146 .0172
(0.0234) (0.0108) (0.0049) (0.0226) (0.0220) (0.0044)
Estimation results from a generalized method of moments estimation as given by eq.
(4); see appendix for details. Standard errors (in parentheses) obtained from 1,000
bootstrap replications. Since some of the age-year cells are very sparsely ￿lled with
households, we run into the problem that the standard bootstrap algorithm may end
up with no observation in a given age-year cell. Therefore, we increase the sample size
drawn in the bootstrap by factor 2 (factor 4 for BHPS) and correct the standard errors
by premultiplying
p
2 (repectively 2 for the BHPS).
Low skilled: GCSE and below, Medium skilled: A-lvls and some tertiary, High skilled:
￿rst university degree and above.
the more standard smoothing parameter of 100, see Table 2. As one can see, our results
are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the choice of the cyclical indicator. The
only apparent di⁄erence is that using the standard HP-￿lter for aggregate GDP, we run
into a corner solution for the estimated variance of ￿xed e⁄ects.
Finally, we check the robustness to our sample selection criteria. First, we try with
dropping only those households that fall in the top-bottom 0.5% percentiles of each age-
group, respectively (instead of using a three standard deviation criterion in an age-year
cell). Second, we check to which extent our results are sensitive to the assumption that
households start to accumulate wage shocks at the age of 25. Instead, we set this age
of labor-market entry to 22, but keep the set of age groups used for estimation constant
(30-55). Results are displayed in Table 3. Third, we look at a subset of households either
excluding the very high skilled or the very low skilled, see Table 4. We do so in order
12Table 5: Individual male wages
Labor Market Entry at Age 25 Labor Market Entry at Age 22
PSID BHPS GSOEP PSID BHPS GSOEP
￿ 0.9668 0.9846 0.9228 0.9553 0.9749 0.9372
(.0809) (.0506) (.0404) (.0739) (.0385) (.0204)
￿2
￿ 0.1262 0.0951 0.296 0.0741 0.0725 0.0100
(.0545) (.0358) (.0133) (.0647) (.0356) (.0105)
￿2
" 0.0572 0.0388 0.0271 0.0534 0.0377 0.0268
(.0095) .0061) (.0032) (.0083) (.0051) (.0026) ￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 0.0083 0.0025 0.0090 0.0149 0.0045 0.0102
(.0162) (.0107) (.0040) (.0137) (.0085) (.0025)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.0165 -0.0050 0.0180 -0.0299 0.0071 0.0204
(.0321) (.0142) (.0080) (.0083) (.0142) (.0050)
See notes to Table 1.
to eliminate the e⁄ects of the very low skilled workers dropping out of the sample into
unemployment along the cycle. Finally, we restrict the sample to individual wage data for
males in order to exclude cyclical e⁄ects from within-household risk sharing, in particular
the possibility of females dropping out of the labor force at economic downturns. The
results of this speci￿cation are presented in Table 5.
Again, our results turn out to be robust. Moving to individual data increases the
estimated autocorrelation somewhat and correspondingly decreases the variance at trend
growth,
￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2, and the cyclicality parameter, ￿ ￿￿￿: Notwithstanding, a one standard
deviation in detrended GDP changes risk by 46% for both the US and Germany. Thus,
the documented patterns on cyclicality can also be found for male prime-age workers,
a group of workers which is less subject to cyclical nonemployment. In summary, our
previous ￿ndings do not only re￿ ect the cyclical behavior of women￿ s labor market
participation. Yet, the results become less statistical signi￿cant.
In a similar vein, we can read the results in Table 4, where we focus on households
with high or medium levels of education - thus leaving out unskilled workers. Results
change litte for this group, although ￿ uctuations in unemployment are typically concen-
trated among the unskilled.
135 Final Thoughts
This paper has provided a cross-country comparison of life-cycle wage dispersions taking
into account the business cycle ￿ uctuations in wage risk. We ￿nd that wage risk increases
in recessions in the US while it decreases in recessions in Germany. For the UK we ￿nd
wage risk to be by-and-large acyclical. There are two interpretations to this. First, we
can think of wages as re￿ ecting marginal productivity as in a neoclassical world. In this
case, there would be signi￿cant structural di⁄erences in the way productivity risk behaves
between the three large economies studied. Second, we can think of wages as rather an
outcome of more complex economic processes, such as bargaining with unions, search-
and-matching, or sticky wage-setting. In this second case, given the structural labor
market di⁄erences of the three economies studied, our ￿ndings suggest new restrictions
on the identi￿cation of structural labor market models, in the sense that these models
should also speak to the cyclicality of wage risk.
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16Appendices
A Details on the Estimation Procedure
The GMM estimator used in this paper employs a weighting matrix to gain e¢ ciency over
the simple unweighted minimum distance estimator. In principle, one should weight the
moment-distances (￿ ￿ m) with the inverse covariance matrix of each moment condition.
In practice, such approach involves estimation of the covariance matrix and can lead to
more imprecision in small samples relative to the use of a unitary weighting matrix.
We follow Storesletten et al. (2004) and take an intermediate approach, where we
estimate the most apparent part of the covariance matrix that results from the de￿nition
of our moment conditions themselves. Yet, we ignore the covariance that results from
the fact that the sequence of two year panels that we construct from the data partly
overlap in the set of households they contain. Instead, we treat the two year panels as
if each of them was sampled independently.
This implies that we presume variance (k = 1) and autocovariance (k = 2) moments,
mk;t;h and mk;t+s;h+j, are uncorrelated as long as s 6= 0 or j 6= 0; since then the wage
information that they summarize stems from di⁄erent, independent households. For
s 6= j; this assumption holds as each household ages by one year each period. For s = j;
we have to invoke the assumption that the overlap of the two year panels is negligible. As
argued, we make this assumption to avoid small sample biases from imprecise covariance
estimation.
By contrast, moments m1;t;h and m2;t;h exhibit some clear cut correlation, as they
both exploit information of the wages of the same set of individuals at time t (as well as
time t+1). Moreover, they are also correlated from the fact that the future wage in period
t + 1 of these households that is used to construct m2;t;h is correlated with the wage in
period t: The covariance ￿12 (t;h) = cov (m1;t;h;m2;t;h) 2 R2￿2 can be easily estimated
within sample. The moment conditions refer to the product ^ !2
i;t;h and ^ !i;t;h^ !i;t+1;h+1 at
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the weighting matrix W then takes block diagonal form
with N2
th^ ￿￿1
12 (t;h) as diagonal elements. In particular, this means we weight moment
conditions more that stem from age-year cells that hold more observations and that are
less kurtotic.
B Monte Carlo Results for the GMM Estimator
To check for potential small sample bias that might be inherent in the GMM method
and to understand how the estimator would be a⁄ected by reducing the number of
moment restrictions by selecting only a subset of age-groups, we run a set of Monte-
Carlo experiments. We simulate the data generating process (DGP) for residual wages
!i;h;t as given in (1) and use an AR(1) process with autocorrelation ￿Y to simulate GDP
devaitions from trend. We do so for N = 60 households for birthcohorts c = 1;:::;58
(in line with the birthcohorts in the PSID - 1913 until 1971). We simulate each of these
cohorts for H = 32 years (again in line with the ages 25-56 we consider). Finally, we
restrict the sample to the years t = c + h = 55;:::;81: This way we obtain a sample
similar to the PSID (though perfectly balanced).
For the DGP we set ￿ = 0:93; ￿2
a = 0:04; ￿2
" = 0:04;
￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 = 0:025;
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
=
￿0:045; and ￿Y = 0:6 roughly in line with the PSID estimates. We assume normally
distributed innovations. We compare the estimator that uses all age groups h = 6;:::;31
to an estimator that uses only information from h = 6;16;26 (corresponding to ages 30,
40, 50 in the actual data). Table 6 displays the results of these experiments.
The results show that there is no strong small sample bias on any of the estimated
parameters. Yet, average estimates and true parameters di⁄er slightly. The standard
errors we obtain and the small sample bias are lower when all moment conditions are
imposed, showing that there is no apparent problem from weak moment conditions. The
e¢ ciency gain from using more moment conditions is most pronounced for the cyclicality
parameter ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ which is intuitive as using information on more age groups implies
more business cycle informtaion being exploited.
Overall, the standard errors in this experiment are comparable to the ones obtained
by running the bootstrap on the actual data as in Tables 1 to 3. Standard errors
are slightly smaller in the simulation experiment but in general of the same order of
magnitude. The di⁄erence is likely due to the fact that the actual data is not balanced
in the size of age-year cells as is the experimental data. In particular, we observe that
also in the simulated data, the variance of ￿xed e⁄ects cannot be estimated very precisely
￿ i.e. it is only weakly identi￿ed.




￿￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Full Set of 0.9272 0.0311 0.0386 0.0277 -0.0452
Moment Conditions (0:0110) (0:0221) (0:0036) (0:0067) (0:0068)
Only ages 6,16,26 0.9265 0.0299 0.0382 0.0285 -0.0450
(0:0168) (0:0259) (0:0054) (0:0089) (0:0123)
True Parameters 0.9300 0.0400 0.0400 0.0250 -0.0450
Results from 5,000 replications of a Monte Carlo experiment of the estimator described
in the paper and appendix A using an age-year cell size of N = 60. The numbers refer
to the average estimate, numbers in brackets give standard deviations.
C Sample Selection
The following tables display the sample selection.
Table 7: Sample Selection
PSID BHPS GSOEP
Initial Number of Observations 68219 38733 60488
Eliminated Number of Observations:
￿Due to elimination of outliers, hours, age,
￿ 2 obs per HH, only HH w/ less than 14 HH members 5269 6734 6995
￿Due to non-consecutive observations 7999 7470 8359
Final sample 54951 24529 45134
19Table 8: Number of Observations by Year
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
PSID 1300 1312 1335 1357 1367 1448 1508 1564 1612 1653 1725 1797 1836
BHPS
GSOEP
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
PSID 1878 1913 1966 1991 2043 2079 2126 2184 2202 2226 2257 2164 2212
BHPS 1509 1485 1498
GSOEP 1595 1597 1678 1699 1682 1676 1695 1716 1706 1679
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
PSID 2616 2692 2588
BHPS 1487 1538 1570 1735 1621 1702 1685 1492 1485 1486 1432 1415 1389
GSOEP 1670 1662 1641 1608 1877 1809 3428 3191 3085 2963 2814 2663
The number of observations refers to the number of households in each two-year
subpanel with consecutive observations in years t;t + 1.
D Further Graphs
Extending the age of entry to 22 does not change the general slope of the life-cycle
pro￿le, see ￿gure 3. In line with Krueger et al. (2009) we ￿nd a slight J-shape which is
more pronounced in incomes, see ￿gure 4
20Figure 3: Life-Cycle Pro￿le of the Variance of Wages starting at age 22













See notes to Figure 2.
Figure 4: Life-Cycle Pro￿le of the Variance of Income starting at age 22













See notes to Figure 2.
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